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FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TO WIN THE WAR:
CAN STATES COMBAT DOMESTIC MINOR SEX
TRAFFICKING DESPITE CDA PREEMPTION?
Stephanie Silvano*
The explosion of the internet and online communication has led to an
alarming increase in an existing epidemic: domestic minor sex trafficking.
Sex traffickers utilize websites, such as Backpage.com, to post trafficking
advertisements depicting minors, which are minimally regulated as a result
of the civil immunity provision of the Communications Decency Act (47
U.S.C. § 230). This immunity provision has been interpreted broadly by the
courts, granting expansive immunity to websites as both publishers and
distributors of content.
In an effort to combat minor sex trafficking at a local level, some state
legislatures enacted statutes criminalizing the knowing publication of
online commercial sex advertisements depicting minors. Backpage.com
challenged these statutes in district courts with great success. Because
these statutes could hold websites liable for the publication of third-party
content, the courts enjoined the laws as preempted by the Communications
Decency Act. Thus, preemption places the states in a lose-lose situation:
states can enact legislation knowing that the legislation will likely be
enjoined or attempt to litigate against websites with little promise for
success.
This Note argues that courts should narrow the scope of § 230’s
immunity given changes in technology and the increase in offensive and
illegal content online. This Note also argues for the enactment of a new
federal criminal statute, in place of individual state legislation, which
would put liability back in the right hands and avoid preemption, while
reducing domestic minor sex trafficking online.
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INTRODUCTION
At only fourteen years old, she worked twelve hours a day servicing
―johns‖ she would meet at local hotels.1 A runaway, she was lured into
prostitution at a time when she was young and vulnerable and was trapped
thereafter with threats and beatings. To find customers, her pimp posted
advertisements, complete with suggestive subject lines2 and provocative
pictures of her body, at Backpage.com with a price tag: $300 an hour. She
never saw a dime.
Stories such as these, though sickening, are all too familiar.3 With the
growth of the internet, sex traffickers are looking to a new channel for
advertising prostitution: Backpage.com, a free online classifieds website
with an active ―adult‖ section.
The site features thousands of
advertisements that include provocative pictures of women and vague
descriptions of their adult services.4 Although each advertisement lists the
poster‘s age, the ages are often incorrect and many advertisements are
actually promoting the prostitution and escort services of minors.
In response to the expansion of online sex trafficking on these sites, some
states such as Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey enacted legislation
that effectively imposes criminal liability on sites that knowingly publish
underage escort advertisements.5 In recent federal litigation, Backpage.com
battled with the states over whether this new legislation is constitutionally
valid6 or preempted by the Communications Decency Act7 (CDA).
Although the district courts in Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey all
1. This story is fictitious, adapted from stories featured in a series of news articles
written after arrests of criminals who used Backpage.com for sex trafficking. See, e.g.,
SHARED HOPE INT‘L, MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING VIA BACKPAGE.COM CASES (2013),
http://www.azgovernor.gov/HTTF/documents/Materials/HTTF_091113_BackpageCases090
513.pdf (providing synopses of 232 cases throughout the United States involving minor sex
trafficking on Backpage.com); Amber Lyon & Steve Turnham, Underage Sex Trade Still
Flourishing Online, CNN (Feb. 5, 2011, 3:12 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/CRIME/
01/20/siu.selling.girl.next.door.backpage.
2. These suggestive subject lines flood the pages of Backpage.com‘s adult section.
Many subject lines and advertisements are filled with code words and falsified ages, thereby
disguising sex trafficking to the typical keyword scanner or untrained eye. For examples of
these promiscuous advertisements, see Brief for Defendants at Ex. A, Backpage.com, LLC v.
Hoffman, No. 13-03952 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013), 2013 WL 4502097 [hereinafter Hoffman
Defendants‘ Brief] (―DIAMOND here let‘s shine together – 19.‘ . . . ‗KILLER
CURVES . . . – 24.‖).
3. See SHARED HOPE INT‘L, supra note 1 (discussing 232 cases of minor sex trafficking
via the internet).
4. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at Ex. A.
5. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315 (West
2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012) (repealed 2013).
6. See generally Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097; Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.
Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262
(W.D. Wash. 2012).
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). The Communications Decency Act (CDA), or Title V
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, was Congress‘s first attempt at regulating liability
and content on the internet and provides civil immunity for websites and other interactive
computer services that publish information provided by third parties. See id. The CDA also
expressly preempts any state laws inconsistent with the federal statute. A more complete
discussion of the history and effects of the CDA can be found in Part I.B.
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enjoined this legislation, forty-nine attorneys general are still fighting to
combat sex trafficking online.8
The litigation in these district courts poses an important question: are
these new state statutes actually preempted by the CDA? Backpage.com
argues that the broad immunity provided by the CDA preempts the
legislation enacted to criminalize the knowing dissemination of minor sex
trafficking advertisements.9 In response, the states argue that the CDA only
preempts inconsistent state laws, and thus the statutes in question are not
preempted.10 Although the courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and
enjoined the legislation, the litigation raised important issues over the
existence and extent of CDA immunity. 11 As a result of this conflict,
suggestions of an amendment to the CDA to remove this immunity
produced spirited debate by many interested parties.12
This Note argues that CDA preemption creates unnecessary barriers to
reform that could help to eliminate one of the largest channels of child
trafficking, online classifieds.13 The internet has exploded over the last two
decades and is now widely used in society as an outlet for speech and
creativity.14 While internet discourse must be protected, the answer is not
8. See Letter from Att‘ys Gen. to Congress (July 23, 2013) [hereinafter Att‘ys Gen.
Letter], available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/Final%20CDA%20Sign%
20On%20Letter.pdf .
9. See Brief for Plaintiff at 17, Hoffman, No. 13-03952, 2013 WL 4502097 [hereinafter
Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief]; Brief for Plaintiff at 9, Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 1200065) [hereinafter Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief]; Brief for Plaintiff at 8, McKenna, 881 F. Supp.
2d 1262 (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief]; infra Part II.B.1.
10. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 11; see also Brief for Defendants at
13, Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (No. 12-00065) [hereinafter Cooper Defendants‘ Brief];
Brief for Defendants at 9–10, McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter
McKenna Defendants‘ Brief]; infra Part II.B.2.
11. Backpage.com also raises meritorious constitutional arguments, but preemption by
the CDA immunizes the site before these important questions are reached. By creating an
initial obstacle for states in enacting legislation, the debate over preemption effectively
determines whether and how states can take action to combat trafficking on a local level.
12. See, e.g., Matt Zimmerman, State AGs Ask Congress to Gut Critical CDA 230
Online Speech Protections, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 24, 2013), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2013/07/state-ags-threaten-gut-cda-230-speech-protections (arguing to keep CDA
immunity for interactive computer services intact). But see Petition to the U.S. Senate,
Amend Communications Decency Act Section 230, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/
petitions/the-u-s-senate-amend-communications-decency-act-section-230 (last visited Sept.
21, 2014) (asking supporters to sign petition in support of amending the CDA to reduce
immunity for interactive computer services).
13. See MARK LATONERO, HUMAN TRAFFICKING ONLINE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES AND ONLINE CLASSIFIEDS 19 (2001), available at
https://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2011/09/HumanTrafficking_FINAL.pdf
(examining the impact of technology on sex trafficking and its prevalence online).
14. See Carl Johnson, The Internet: Can’t Live Without It, FORBES (Nov. 2, 2011, 4:31
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/carljohnson/2011/11/02/the-internet-cant-live-without-it
(discussing a 2011 Cisco study finding that more than 50 percent of respondents between
ages 18 and 29 claimed they could not live without internet access); see also Ryan Dalton,
Note, Abolishing Child Sex Trafficking on the Internet: Imposing Criminal Culpability on
Digital Facilitators, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1097, 1108 (2013) (observing that the internet has
become more accessible than ever before as a majority of American adults own a computer,
cell phone, or other device).
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such expansive immunity. Because the internet is mature and websites can
now better adapt to regulation, expansive immunity will no longer stunt free
speech and online commerce.15 As a result, civil immunity should be
narrowed, but criminal liability should be strengthened to punish criminal
activity online. Thus, a change in the current law is necessary to reduce
minor trafficking by criminalizing the knowing publication from the
source—sites like Backpage.com.
This Note examines the conflicting arguments regarding CDA
preemption of these state criminal laws and explores the differing judicial
interpretations of CDA immunity among the circuit courts, while also
identifying possible solutions for states in the face of CDA preemption.
Part I provides background information on online sex trafficking, the
history of the CDA, and the law of preemption. Part II examines the
current state legislation and Backpage.com litigation that has raised
important preemption concerns. Part III focuses on the current conflict
regarding the interpretation of CDA immunity and explores the potential
alternatives for states in the face of CDA preemption. Finally, Part IV
argues that a narrower interpretation of immunity and a new federal
criminal statute are necessary to effectively combat domestic minor sex
trafficking nationwide.
I. A PRIMER ON SEX TRAFFICKING, PREEMPTION, AND THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
As explained in greater detail below, online classifieds have become one
of the major channels of minor sex trafficking. Part I.A explores the current
landscape of sex trafficking with respect to online classifieds, illustrating
the extensiveness of the nationwide problem. Part I.B reviews the history
and purpose of the CDA and its impact on internet regulation. Part I.C
provides an overview of preemption and its use by the courts.
A. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking and the Internet
Minor sex trafficking is a growing problem in America, and the internet
is one of the primary channels traffickers use to find customers.16 Part
I.A.1 defines minor sex trafficking and illustrates its prevalence in the
United States. Part I.A.2 then explains online classifieds and how these
sites are used as channels for sex trafficking.

15. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1164 n.15 (9th Cir.
2008) (―The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that could easily be
smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of laws.‖).
16. See LINDA A. SMITH ET AL., SHARED HOPE INT‘L, THE NATIONAL REPORT ON
DOMESTIC MINOR SEX TRAFFICKING: AMERICA‘S PROSTITUTED CHILDREN 19 (2009),
available
at
http://sharedhope.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/SHI_National_Report_
on_DMST_2009.pdf.
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1. Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking
In the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), Congress
defined sex trafficking as ―the recruitment, harboring, transportation,
provision, or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex
act.‖17 The United States is a ―source, transit, and destination country for
men, women, and children . . . subjected to sex trafficking and forced
labor.‖18 Experts estimate that more than 100,000 American children are
victimized through sex trafficking in America each year.19 This does not
include foreign children who are victims of trafficking in the United States
or victims over the age of eighteen.20
In an effort to protect victims of all ages, Congress enacted the TVPA—
the first federal law enacted to protect victims and prosecute perpetrators of
trafficking.21 The TVPA creates a framework for the prevention of
victimization and protection of victims, while establishing minimum
standards for governments to help eliminate trafficking. 22 The TVPA also
strengthens prosecution and punishment of traffickers by addressing the
interpretation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.23 Although this
statute and its framework are a step toward a solution, ambiguity in the
TVPA‘s application leaves room for improvement, as domestic minor sex
trafficking remains a growing issue.24 Accordingly, states enacted new
laws to help fight domestic minor sex trafficking that criminalize
commercial sex advertisements depicting minors.25
2. Online Classifieds
Since the expansion of the internet, a number of classified advertising
websites have developed and are now a popular alternative to traditional
print advertising in newspapers.26 Sites like Craigslist, Backpage.com, and
17. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (TVPA), 22 U.S.C. § 7102(9) (2012).
18. U.S. DEP‘T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT JUNE 2014 397 (2014),
available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm.
19. SMITH ET AL., supra note 16, at 4 (quoting Ernie Allen from the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children who noted that ―[t]he best estimates, the best data, suggests
that . . . at least [] 100,000 American kids a year are victimized through the practice of child
prostitution‖).
20. See id.
21. 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101–09 (2012).
22. Id. §§ 7104–07.
23. Id. § 7109.
24. Misperceptions of the definition of sex trafficking under the TVPA and confusion
regarding its practical application have weakened the law‘s efficacy. See SMITH ET AL., supra
note 16, at 7. Further, the general public does not fully understand the issue and its
prevalence in American society. See id. Although many children are runaways or part of the
child welfare system, some are recruited from middle class families as well, illustrating the
widespread scope of domestic minor sex trafficking. See id. at 9.
25. See infra Part II.A.
26. See Jeff Bercovici, Sorry, Craig: Study Finds Craigslist Took $5 Billion From
Newspapers, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovici/
2013/08/14/sorry-craig-study-finds-craigslist-cost-newspapers-5-billion/ (discussing a recent
study which found that Craigslist is an inexpensive online alternative to traditional print
advertising and cost print newspapers $5 billion in revenue from 2000 to 2007).
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eBay Classifieds provide users with a forum for buying and selling goods
and services to a broader audience on the web.27 These websites group
advertisements by location and category, similar to print advertisements.28
The use of these websites has grown exponentially as internet use
increases.29
Each website boasts a broad array of categories from appliances to
roommates to job postings.30 Many websites, however, also feature an
―adult services‖ section with opportunities for users to post advertisements
offering or requesting sexual services.31 These websites have come under
scrutiny for featuring adult classifieds because many postings are actually
for the prostitution of women and children.32
Websites, including online classified sites like Backpage.com, have
become one of the primary channels of sex trafficking.33 This is in part due
to technological advances on the internet that make information easily
accessible and provide a forum for anonymity, which allows traffickers to
post advertisements of minors for a world of customers to see with ease and
security.34 Only a few years ago, Craigslist was the leader in prostitution
advertising online.35 But, pressure from several state attorneys general led
Craigslist to eliminate its adult services section.36 Although some argued
that this decision reduced the market for prostitution and trafficking online,

27. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 12–13.
28. See id.; see also BACKPAGE, http://www.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014);
CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014); EBAY CLASSIFIEDS,
http://www.ebayclassifieds.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
29. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that the percentage of online American
adults that reported using sites such as Craigslist increased from 32 percent in 2007 to 53
percent in 2010).
30. See, e.g., BACKPAGE, supra note 28; CRAIGSLIST, supra note 28; EBAY CLASSIFIEDS,
supra note 28.
31. See, e.g., BACKPAGE, supra note 28; CITYVIBE, http://www.cityvibe.com (last visited
Sept. 21, 2014); EROS, http://www.eros.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014); MYREDBOOK,
http://www.myredbook.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (seized by the FBI and IRS for
money laundering based on prostitution). These websites all feature online classified
advertisements for adult services. However, there are many other sites that host online
classifieds of adult services that may go undetected, as many traffickers use code words and
other tactics to post advertisements in other areas of classified websites (such as massage
services) or to pass company keyword searches. See LATONERO, supra note 13, at 19.
32. See David A. Lieb, Online Sex Ads Draw Scrutiny, SEACOASTONLINE (Sept. 30,
2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/articles/20130930-BIZ-309300303.
33. See generally SHARED HOPE INT‘L, supra note 1 (listing 232 reported cases of sex
trafficking via Backpage.com in forty-five states over the last several years); Abigail Kuzma,
A Letter to Congress: The Communications Decency Act Promotes Human Trafficking, 34
CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 23, 27 (2013) (noting that websites such as Backpage.com have
created ―virtual brothels‖ for child sex trafficking).
34. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 1108.
35. See Backpage Replaces Craigslist as Prostitution-Ad Leader, AIM GROUP (Oct. 19,
2010) [hereinafter AIM GROUP 2010], http://aimgroup.com/2010/10/19/backpage-replacescraigslist-as-prostitution-ad-leader.
36. See Christopher Leonard, Craigslist Adult Services Section REMOVED,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 4, 2010, 11:50 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/04/
craigslist-adult-services_0_n_705758.html.
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in reality many of these ads migrated to other websites including
Backpage.com.37
Backpage.com is now the leader in adult services advertising and is
facing the same pressure as Craigslist encountered only a few years ago.38
In the month following Craigslist‘s decision, Backpage.com saw its revenue
increase 15.3 percent due to the migration of adult advertisements to new
channels.39 Recent studies estimate that Backpage.com‘s monthly revenue
from its online escort and ―body rub‖ sections, which host many suspected
prostitution and sex trafficking advertisements, is more than $4 million.40
These profits are derived in part from the fee Backpage.com currently
charges for posting adult advertisements, though this fee differs by category
and location.41 In order to post an adult advertisement on Backpage.com, a
user must enter a title, age, description, and email.42 Users may upload up
to twelve images, though this is not required.43 After completing this form
and choosing the frequency of the posting, the user must enter valid credit
card information to purchase the advertisement.44 After review,45 the
advertisement is published on Backpage.com.
This increase in prostitution advertising on Backpage.com led attorneys
general to ask the site to remove its adult services section, a request that
Backpage.com has continuously refused.46 Rather than eliminate its
37. See Marissa Louie, Craigslist Saga: Sex Ads Get Pushed Elsewhere, but Kroobe
Says No, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 17, 2010, 3:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
marissa-louie/craigslist-saga-sex-ads-g_b_798043.html (noting that sex advertisements have
migrated to Backpage.com, Oodle, and eBay‘s LoQuo.com following Craigslist‘s removal of
its adult services section).
38. According to a recent study by the AIM Group, a consulting group that researches
interactive media and classified advertising, Backpage.com generated 82.3 percent of the
estimated revenue from online prostitution advertising from June 2012 to May 2013. Online
Prostitution-Ad Revenue Crosses Craigslist Benchmark, AIM GROUP (July 10, 2013)
[hereinafter AIM GROUP 2013], http://aimgroup.com/2013/07/10/online-prostitution-adrevenue-crosses-craigslist-benchmark. These statistics illustrate Backpage.com‘s growth in
the illicit advertising market. See id.
39. AIM GROUP 2010, supra note 35.
40. AIM GROUP 2013, supra note 38. The AIM Group acknowledges its use of
estimations in its data collection and the potential inaccuracies in its results given that the
study only researched select markets where Backpage.com is localized. See id. However,
the study still provides a helpful illustration of the prevalence of prostitution and trafficking
online and how websites profit from such illicit activity. Id.
41. For example, advertisements for escort services in northern New Jersey cost $12.00
per posting, with higher fees charged regularly for highlighted or repeated postings. See
North
Jersey,
N.J.,
BACKPAGE,
http://posting.northjersey.backpage.com/online/
classifieds/PostAdPPI.html/nnj/northjersey.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (click
―adult entertainment‖; ―escorts‖; ―North Jersey‖; ―Continue‖).
In contrast, escort
advertisements in Provo, Utah, cost only $3.00 per advertisement. See Provo, Utah,
BACKPAGE,
http://posting.provo.backpage.com/online/classifieds/PostAdPPI.html/pvu/
provo.backpage.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2014) (click ―adult entertainment‖; ―escorts‖;
―Provo‖; ―Continue‖).
42. See North Jersey, N.J., supra note 41.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See infra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
46. See Martha Kessler, Backpage Calls for National Taskforce to Study Prevention of
Illegal Online Ads, 15 Elec. Com. & L. Rep. 16–19 (BNA) (Oct. 27, 2010).
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lucrative adult services section, Backpage.com purports to have taken steps
to combat online prostitution and trafficking.47 In a recent article,
Backpage.com General Counsel Liz McDougall discussed the steps
Backpage.com has taken to screen advertisements for illicit activity.48
McDougall claimed that employees remove more than one million
advertisements from the site every month, approximately 18,000 of which
are from the adult category.49 After running all classified advertisements
through a keyword filter, McDougall asserted that Backpage.com employs a
team of 110 employees to manually review each advertisement submitted to
the adult category.50 The priority of employees during the review process is
to look for minors and illegal activity.51 Since implementing this system,
McDougall claimed that Backpage.com reports to the National Center for
Missing and Exploited Children approximately 400 advertisements each
month that it suspects involve a minor .52
Although the review process may appear comprehensive and effective,
with multiple reviews and reports to national agencies, employees review
posts subjectively based on their own estimates of age and legality.53
Consequently, many cases of minor sex trafficking may go unreported if the
particular employee reviewer guesses that the person depicted is over
eighteen. Further, Backpage.com‘s Terms of Use do not prohibit users
from posting on behalf of another individual, which permits traffickers to
post on behalf of their victims, possibly without detection.54 Accordingly,
many minor sex trafficking advertisements—and victims—go undetected.
B. The Communications Decency Act of 1996
The Communications Decency Act of 199655 was one of Congress‘s first
attempts at regulating the new and growing internet medium. Part I.B.1
explains the state of the law before the enactment of the CDA. Part I.B.2
discusses the history and purpose of the legislation. Part I.B.3 clarifies the
distinction between interactive computer services and information content
providers. Part I.B.4 examines the exceptions to § 230 immunity.

47. See Julie Ruvolo, Sex Trafficking on Backpage.com: Much Ado About (Statistically)
Nothing, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Oct. 6, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/10/06/sextrafficking-on-backpage-com-much-ado-about-statistically-nothing/.
Google claims to
screen advertisements through both automated and manual review as well. See Kessler,
supra note 46.
48. See Ruvolo, supra note 47.
49. See id.
50. See id. Employees review advertisements once before publishing, and then a
different group of employees reviews the advertisements again after going live on the site.
See id.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.; see also Terms, BACKPAGE.COM, http://www.backpage.com/
online/TermsOfUse (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
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1. Before the Communications Decency Act
Before Congress enacted the CDA in 1996, the internet was a new
medium and regulation was minimal.56 Legal liability for user-generated
content was not considered by courts or legislatures until 1995, when a New
York State Supreme Court examined whether an online publisher could be
held liable for defamatory statements made by a third party in Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy.57 Defendant Prodigy, the owner and operator of
a computer network, produced the online bulletin board ―Money Talk.‖58 A
third-party user made allegedly defamatory statements about plaintiff
Stratton Oakmont, a securities firm.59 The court held that Prodigy was a
―publisher‖ because ―[b]y actively utilizing technology and manpower to
delete notes from its computer bulletin boards on the basis of
offensiveness . . . PRODIGY is clearly making decisions as to
content . . . and such decisions constitute editorial control.‖60 Therefore,
Prodigy was a publisher for the purposes of plaintiff‘s libel claims.61
2. The Communications Decency Act
In response to Stratton Oakmont, Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA.62
Section 230 provides immunity in two ways to interactive computer
services, defined as an ―information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a
computer server.‖63. First, under the CDA no interactive computer service
may be treated as the publisher or speaker of third-party content.64 Second,
interactive computer services are immune from civil liability if they
voluntarily take action to restrict access to obscene and objectionable

56. See KrisAnn Norby-Jahner, Comment, “Minor” Online Sexual Harassment and the
CDA § 230 Defense: New Directions for Internet Service Provider Liability, 32 HAMLINE L.
REV. 207, 234 (2009) (―Before the CDA was enacted, courts had to deal with legal claims in
the Internet medium without legislative guidance. Using common-law principles, the courts
applied publishing and distributing standards to online claims.‖).
57. See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 WL 323710,
at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. Id. at *4 (internal citations omitted).
61. See id.
62. See John E. D. Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User Generated Content:
Craigslist, A Case Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 85, 104 (2010).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
64. Id. § 230(c)(1) (―No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.‖). Although some argue that § 230 only confers publisher immunity and
does not impact distributor liability, the majority of courts have not recognized this
distinction. See, e.g., David R. Sheridan, Zeran v. AOL and the Effect of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act Upon Liability for Defamation on the Internet, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 147, 167–72 (1997); David Lukmire, Note, Can the Courts Tame the Communications
Decency Act?: The Reverberations of Zeran v. America Online, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 371, 389–90 (2010). Whether distributor liability remains intact is not considered in this
Note.
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content online.65 This effectively repudiated Stratton Oakmont and
drastically departed from traditional defamation jurisprudence at common
law.66
Although the statute was a legislative response to the Stratton Oakmont
decision, the purpose of the CDA as stated in the statutory text is ―to
promote the continued development of the Internet . . . [and] to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation.‖67 At the time, the
internet was in its infancy and Congress feared that the new technology
would be stifled by burdensome regulations and litigation.68 The CDA was
intended in part to promote the prosperity of the internet as a medium and a
marketplace.69
However, the CDA‘s purpose is twofold—Congress also recognized the
challenges that the internet presented in policing obscene content and
preventing children‘s access to objectionable material online.70 Therefore,
Congress enacted the CDA ―to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children‘s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material‖ and ―to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to
deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by
means of computer.‖71 These two reasons behind the CDA, as listed in the
statutory text,72 indicate that Congress was also concerned with protecting
children.73

65. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) describes civil liability:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of— (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken
to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).
Based on an expansive interpretation of the ―interactive computer service‖ definition, courts
have construed these immunity provisions to provide broad immunity to websites and other
online operators facing both criminal and civil liability. See infra Part III.A.1.
66. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 104. The publisher or distributor‘s level of control
over the defamatory material determines liability for third-party content in common law
defamation cases. Under the common law of torts, ―one who only delivers or transmits
defamatory matter published by a third person is subject to liability if, but only if, he knows
or has reason to know of its defamatory character.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581
(1977). Courts have held traditional print media outlets liable for the knowing publication of
defamatory or criminal third-party content, which directly contradicts Congress‘s decision
for websites in the CDA. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill.
2009) (noting that print newspapers and magazines may be held liable for publishing
advertisements that harm third parties (citing Braun v. Soldier of Fortune, 968 F.2d 1110,
1114 (11th Cir. 1992))).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2).
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. Id. § 230(b)(4).
71. Id. § 230(b)(4)–(5).
72. Section 230(b) lists the policy reasons behind Congress‘s decision to enact the CDA:
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3. Interactive Computer Services and Information Content Providers
The distinction between ―interactive computer services‖ and
―information content providers‖ is critical to determine immunity.74 The
statute defines an interactive computer service as ―any information service,
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems
operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.‖75
Using this definition, courts have recognized that interactive computer
services include a wide range of websites and services other than just
internet services providers.76 For example, courts have found that eBay,
Amazon.com, America Online, Inc. (AOL), and other websites that host
third-party content are interactive computer services.77

(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user control over what information
is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other
interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to
restrict their children‘s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material;
and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
Id. § 230(b). These provisions illuminate the reasons behind Congress‘s choices in drafting
§ 230. See id.
73. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,502–05 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 22,044–46 (1995).
Congress enacted an additional section of the CDA to fulfill its purpose of protecting
children and reducing obscenity in response to the increasing presence of online sex sales
and pornography online. See Abby R. Perer, Note, Policing the Virtual Red Light District: A
Legislative Solution to the Problems of Internet Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, 77 BROOK.
L. REV. 823, 831 (2012). Section 223(a) criminalizes the knowing transmission of obscene
images to any person under the age of 18, and § 223(d) forbids the knowing sending of any
message ―that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.‖ Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 859–60 (1997) (discussing § 223 and the provisions under scrutiny in
the litigation). The Supreme Court invalidated § 223 in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844. In its
analysis, the Court distinguished the internet from other types of media and examined the
text of the statute in this context. Id. at 870. The Court noted that the distinctions between
the internet and broadcast media meant that precedent provides no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny in this case. Id. Ultimately, the Court held that § 223 was
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id. at 870–85. Although the decision removed
the provision of the CDA that most clearly protected children from online obscenity, both
Congress clearly discussed the need for online protection in the meetings leading up to
enactment. See 141 CONG. REC. 15,502–05 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 22,044–46 (1995).
74. See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
75. Id. § 230(f)(2).
76. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1030 n.15 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the broad
definition of interactive computer services and citing cases that have applied the definition to
grant immunity).
77. See id.; see also Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (holding that a website is an interactive service provider because it provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a server).
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By contrast, an information content provider is ―any person or entity that
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the internet or any other interactive computer
service.‖78 Courts have narrowly construed this definition to recognize
users of websites that personally create and develop content as information
content providers that can face liability.79 Though this distinction may
seem insignificant at first blush, it has become intensely debated in the
courts and has led to broad immunity for websites from both civil and
criminal liability.80 Although interactive computer services are not
immunized when explicitly developing informational content, judicial
interpretations of § 230(c) found that interactive computer services do have
some flexibility when making editorial changes before becoming exposed
to liability as information content providers.81
4. Exceptions to the Communications Decency Act
The CDA also contains a few important exceptions that greatly impact
immunity and further these policy goals.82 Under § 230(e), Congress
explained the effect that the CDA would have on other laws.83 For
example, the CDA has no impact on ―any law pertaining to intellectual
property‖ and will not ―be construed to limit the application of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.‖84 The provisions that
are most critical to this Note dictate the effect of the CDA on criminal law
and on state laws.85
Under § 230(e)(1), Congress expressly directed that ―[n]othing in [§ 230]
shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this
title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual
exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal
statute.‖86 This provision seems logical, given that one of the stated policy
goals of the CDA is to vigorously enforce federal criminal laws to deter and
punish computer crimes such as trafficking, obscenity, and stalking.87
Under § 230(e)(3), the CDA cannot be construed ―to prevent any State from
78. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
79. See Eric Weslander, Comment, Murky “Development”: How the Ninth Circuit
Exposed Ambiguity Within the Communications Decency Act, and Why Internet Publishers
Should Worry, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 267, 268 (2008) (―For years, courts have construed the
terms ‗creation‘ and ‗development‘ narrowly. As a result, websites have been allowed to
solicit, encourage, edit, and aggressively promote information supplied by third parties
without being potentially liable for its contents.‖).
80. See generally Larkin, supra note 62; see also infra Part III.
81. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER & HOLLY K. TOWLE, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS ¶ 10.09[3] (2009); see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d
327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that under § 230(c)(1) websites must have some editorial
discretion to decide whether to publish, edit, or withdraw content without facing liability).
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (entitled ―Effect on other laws‖).
83. See id.
84. Id. § 230(e)(2), (4).
85. Id. § 230(e)(1), (3).
86. Id. § 230(e)(1).
87. Id. § 230(b)(5).
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enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section,‖ but ―[n]o cause
of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.‖88 Although this
provision may seem clear, it has been challenging for courts to interpret
because it does not define what type of state laws are consistent with the
CDA.89
Courts engage in a three-part inquiry to determine whether immunity
exists under the CDA and consequently whether a state law claim is
consistent with the CDA: ―[i] whether Defendant is a provider of an
interactive computer service; [ii] if the postings at issue are information
provided by another information content provider; and [iii] whether
Plaintiff's claims seek to treat Defendant as a publisher or speaker of third
party content.‖90 If the answer to each question is ―yes,‖ immunity should
be granted, and thus the state law cause of action is inconsistent with the
CDA.91
These provisions have given rise to controversy, as some plaintiffs have
attempted to prosecute interactive computer services under state criminal
laws.92 However, the plain text of § 230(e)(1) exempts ―[f]ederal criminal
statutes‖ specifically and does not mention state laws and therefore
eliminates any argument for state law exemption.93 Further, most courts
have read § 230(e)(1) and (e)(3) together to find that Congress only
intended to give interactive computer services immunity from state laws
that are consistent with the CDA; any state criminal law that is inconsistent
with the CDA is preempted.94 It is clear, however, that Congress did not

88. Id. § 230(e)(3).
89. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690, 702
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (―230(e)(3) provides no substantive content‖); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc.,
958 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (observing that
the CDA ―contains no explicit expression of congressional intent with respect to the scope of
preemption‖).
90. Gibson v. Craigslist, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 7735 (RMB), 2009 WL 1704355, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2009) (quoting Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 564
F. Supp. 2d 544, 548 (E.D. Va. 2008)); see also Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1037 (9th
Cir. 2003) (Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See Gibson, 2009 WL 1704355, at *3–4.
92. See generally Doe v. Bates, No. 5 Civ. 00091 (DF), 2006 WL 3813758 (E.D. Tex.
Dec. 27, 2006) (unsuccessfully sued Yahoo for hosting child pornography on its
―Candyman‖ group). A number of civil cases have attempted to hold websites liable as a
result of sex crimes against children. See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir.
2008) (negligence claim against MySpace after thirteen-year-old girl was sexually assaulted
by an adult she met on MySpace); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 2001)
(negligence action against internet service provider for creating chat rooms where users
market obscene photographs to minors). The majority of cases involving CDA immunity are
civil in nature and relate to claims of libel and defamation. See infra Part III.A–B. However,
these cases granting immunity for negligence and criminal claims show the unbridled reach
of the CDA that poses a significant challenge to young victimized plaintiffs.
93. See Voicenet Commc‘ns, Inc. v. Corbett, No. 04 Civ. 01318, 2006 WL 2506318, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006) (finding that ―if Congress had wanted state criminal statutes to
trump the CDA as well, it knew how to say so‖).
94. See id.
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intend, expressly or impliedly, to automatically preempt all state law causes
of action pertaining to interactive computer services.95
C. The Supremacy Clause and Federal Preemption
Preemption is ―the principle . . . that a federal law can supersede or
supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.‖96 This principle is
derived from the Supremacy Clause, which states that the ―Constitution,
and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land.‖97 Under the Supremacy
Clause, federal law will override any conflicting state law in cases where
both valid state and federal law could apply.98 Under the preemption
doctrine, however, states completely lose the power to regulate an area of
law regardless of any conflict with federal law due to Congress‘s express or
implied intent to preempt state law.99
A federal law expressly preempts state laws when Congress explicitly
states an intention to preempt any state laws.100 Preemption can be implied
in two ways: field preemption and conflict preemption.101 Field
preemption allows Congress to indicate the intent to occupy an entire field
of regulation, thereby preempting states from enacting any laws in that
area.102 Conflict preemption allows Congress to preempt any state law that
directly conflicts with federal law.103 Conflict preemption typically occurs
when an individual cannot possibly comply with both state and federal
law.104 It also occurs where state law ―stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.‖105
Each kind of preemption poses unique challenges for courts.106 Despite
these differences, all questions of preemption begin with an examination of
95. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1130 (E.D. Va. 1997), aff’d, 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (―Congress did not intend to occupy the field of liability . . . to the
exclusion of state law. Section 230‘s language and legislative history [reflect] that
Congress‘s purpose in enacting that section was not to preclude any state regulation of the
internet, but rather to eliminate obstacles to the private development of blocking and filtering
technologies capable of restricting inappropriate online content.‖).
96. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1368–69 (10th ed. 2009).
97. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
98. Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771
(1994) (discussing the distinction between supremacy and preemption, noting that
supremacy does not strip power from the states).
99. See id. (observing that ―preemption is a significantly more radical inroad on state
power than supremacy‖).
100. See Gade v. Nat‘l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass‘ns, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
106. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical
Study of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1604, 1606 (2007).

390

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

congressional intent.107 In order to discern congressional intent, courts
generally look to the structure and the text of the federal statute at issue.108
Unfortunately, congressional intent is often difficult to determine,109 and
thus ―multiple interpretations of the preemptive scope of a federal statute
are almost always plausible.‖110 Courts are then confronted with the
additional challenge of reconciling the many interpretations before coming
to a decision.111
The Supreme Court recognizes a presumption against federal preemption,
where the Court ―start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‖112 This presumption helps
courts determine whether Congress intended preemption and, if so, the
scope of the statute‘s intended preemption.113
Because the preemption question can only be answered by the specific
statutory scheme at issue, there exists no uniform resolution for the courts
and cases are often disparate.114 Therefore, interpretation of the scope of
CDA preemption here is influenced by the specific cases that have
previously addressed the statutory scheme, as discussed in Part III.
II. THE LAWS AND THE LITIGATION: BACKPAGE.COM VERSUS THE STATES
Recent state statutes, enacted by Washington, Tennessee, New Jersey,
and Connecticut, criminalizing the knowing publication of minor sex
trafficking advertisements online led to contentious litigation in district
courts between Backpage.com and the states. Part II of this Note examines
the laws and the litigation involved in Backpage.com v. McKenna,115
Backpage.com v. Cooper,116 and Backpage.com v. Hoffman117 and
107. See id.
108. See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (discussing how courts should interpret whether a state
regulation is preempted by a federal statute).
109. See Note, supra note 106, at 1606. (―In implied preemption cases, there are no
statutory provisions explaining which state laws Congress intended to preempt, and even
when Congress includes an express preemption clause in a statute, such clauses are often
absurdly vague . . . .‖). This is the challenge at the heart of this Note, as courts grapple with
the difficult task of determining congressional intent to decide whether the CDA preempts a
particular state law.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1607.
112. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The Court has offered rationales for this
presumption which all center around promoting federalism. See Note, supra note 106, at
1607. Because of the serious issues raised by this presumption, scholarly debate over the
justification and applicability of the presumption against preemption will continue. See id. at
1626.
113. See Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
114. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973) (―Our
prior cases on pre-emption are not precise guidelines in the present controversy, for each
case turns on the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in
question.‖).
115. 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
116. 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).
117. No. 13 Civ. 03952, 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013).

2014]

FIGHTING A LOSING BATTLE TO WIN THE WAR

391

highlights the important conflict regarding CDA preemption that effectively
decides these cases. Part II.A discusses the state statutes at issue and the
purposes behind their enactment. Part II.B outlines the arguments
presented by each party and explains the courts‘ decisions in McKenna,
Cooper, and Hoffman.
A. States Outlaw Commercial Sex Advertisements Depicting Minors
Washington was the first state to enact a law criminalizing ―advertising
commercial sexual abuse of a minor.‖118 The statute effectively outlaws the
knowing publication of commercial sex advertisements depicting
children.119 It served as a model for the Tennessee and New Jersey statutes
enacted thereafter.120 The statutory text is nearly identical, with only a few
key distinctions. However, the effect is the same in that the statutes
criminalize the knowing publication or dissemination of minor sex
trafficking advertisements online or in print.121
118. The relevant provisions of the Washington statute as enacted in 2012 are as follows:
A person commits the offense of advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor
if he or she knowingly publishes, disseminates, or displays, or causes directly or
indirectly, to be published, disseminated, or displayed, any advertisement for a
commercial sex act, which is to take place in the state of Washington and that
includes the depiction of a minor. . . .
In a prosecution under this statute it is not a defense that the defendant did not
know the age of the minor depicted in the advertisement. It is a defense, which the
defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made
a reasonable bona fide attempt to ascertain the true age of the minor depicted in the
advertisement by requiring, prior to publication, dissemination, or display of the
advertisement, production of a driver‘s license, marriage license, birth certificate,
or other governmental or educational identification card or paper of the minor
depicted in the advertisement and did not rely solely on oral or written
representations of the minor‘s age, or the apparent age of the minor as depicted. In
order to invoke the defense, the defendant must produce for inspection by law
enforcement a record of the identification used to verify the age of the person
depicted in the advertisement.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012) (repealed 2013); see also N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:13-10 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315 (West 2012). The New Jersey
statutory text is almost identical to the Washington text, although it presents more findings
and guidance behind the legislature‘s policy choices in the statutory text. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:13-10.
119. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104.
120. See id.; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315.
121. The Washington and New Jersey statutes are almost identical in text and effect in
that they criminalize the knowing publication, dissemination, or display, as well as the direct
or indirect causation, of advertisements of commercial sex acts depicting minors. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104. Thus, the law applies to both
traffickers and hosts, and websites like Backpage.com could face criminal liability if they
knowingly published or displayed such advertisements. The Tennessee statute is phrased
differently, but was also attacked because it criminalizes the knowing sale or offer for sale of
an advertisement featuring a criminal sex act with a minor, and therefore has the same
practical effect as the Washington and New Jersey statutes. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13315. The Connecticut statute enacted in 2012 has withstood scrutiny because it only applies
to users of these websites, not the websites themselves. A person must ―knowingly
[purchase] advertising space for an advertisement for a commercial sex act that includes a
depiction of a minor‖ to have committed the crime. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-196i
(West 2012). Therefore, the Connecticut statute has not faced judicial scrutiny and may be a
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Further, these statutes each contain a prohibited defense and an
affirmative defense.122 First, the laws expressly state that it is not a defense
that the defendant did not know the age of the minor depicted in the
advertisement.123 Second, the laws state that it is a defense that a defendant
made a reasonable, good faith effort to ascertain the true age of the minor
depicted in the advertisement prior to publication.124 But, this defense
poses a hurdle for most defendants as it requires that, prior to publication,
the defendant requested ―production of a driver‘s license, marriage license,
birth certificate, or other governmental or educational identification card or
paper of the minor depicted and did not rely solely on oral or written
representations of the minor‘s age, or the apparent age of the minor as
depicted.‖125 This poses a challenge to Backpage.com and other websites
that screen for depicted minors based on the apparent age of the minor and
require no other proof of age.126
The states enacted these statutes in an effort to combat sex trafficking
online. The New Jersey legislature outlined its findings in the statutory
text, noting that ―[a]dvertisements for selling the services of girls as escorts
on Internet websites falsely claim that these girls are 18 years of age or
older, when the girls actually are minors.‖127 After acknowledging the
Washington and Connecticut laws previously enacted to combat sex
trafficking online, the New Jersey legislature concluded that ―[s]ex
trafficking of minors should be eliminated in conformity with federal laws
prohibiting the sexual exploitation of children‖ and criminalized advertising
commercial sexual abuse of a minor.128 These laws reflect the legislatures‘
recognition that ―the sale of children for commercial sexual abuse either
online or in print is unacceptable,‖ and legislative action is needed to help
society‘s most vulnerable citizens.129 However, the legislative targeting of
minor sex trafficking advertising online poses unique issues in light of the
CDA‘s immunity provision.
B. Backpage.com versus the States: The Preemption Question
Part II.B discusses the first issue presented in the litigation and the crux
of this Note—whether the state legislation that criminalizes the publication
viable alternative for state legislatures should they choose to abandon their crusade against
the websites that host these advertisements. See Dalton, supra note 14, at 1115 n.82.
122. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2).
123. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2).
124. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2).
125. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104(2); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(g);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-315(c).
126. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
127. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:13-10(a)(3).
128. Id. § 2C:13-10(a)(8).
129. Delvin Bill to Combat Online Child Escort Ads Passes House, WASHINGTON STATE
SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS (Feb. 28, 2012), http://src.wastateleg.org/delvin-bill-tocombat-online-child-escort-ads-passes-house.
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of minor sex trafficking advertisements is preempted by the CDA.
Part II.B.1 explains the arguments for CDA preemption, and Part II.B.2
outlines the arguments against preemption. Part II.B.3 discusses the district
courts‘ ultimate decision in finding that the CDA likely preempts the state
legislation at issue.130
1. Backpage.com: Arguments for Preemption
In its McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman briefs, plaintiff Backpage.com131
argued for a broad interpretation of CDA immunity as applied by the
majority of circuit courts.132 Backpage.com cited the many cases that have
granted websites immunity from civil liability, noting that ―this broad
immunity avoids the ‗obvious chilling effect‘ on free speech‖ Congress
sought to prevent.‖133
Backpage.com argued that § 230(e)(3) grants interactive computer
services immunity ―under any state law of whatever kind, including
criminal laws,‖ noting that there are exceptions for federal criminal laws but
not for similar state laws.134 Backpage.com argued that if Congress
intended to exempt state criminal laws as well, it would have expressly
included the language in § 230(e)(3).135 As a result, Backpage.com
concluded that the criminal statutes at issue are inconsistent with § 230

130. The district courts in these cases were tasked with deciding whether a preliminary
injunction should be granted. As a result, the arguments for preemption, First Amendment,
and the Commerce Clause, were all addressed under the umbrella question of whether the
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits; this is one of the prongs of the test for
preliminary injunctions. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see
also Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1269 (W.D. Wash. 2012).
Thus, the court only goes so far as to decide whether the statutes would likely be preempted
or violate the Constitution. See McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
131. Although the Internet Archive is also a plaintiff in these cases, its position is not the
focus of the litigation or within the scope of this Note.
132. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 8–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s
Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9–13. This Note will
discuss the arguments Backpage.com presented in the McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman
litigation collectively due to the extensive similarities among the briefs submitted. In all
three cases, plaintiff Backpage.com filed nearly identical briefs in support of its motions that
presented the same key arguments relating to CDA preemption. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s
Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9–13; McKenna
Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 8–12. The Hoffman brief may be the only outlier, as it
engaged in an even more thorough analysis of the key arguments supporting CDA immunity.
Further, the Hoffman brief used the decisions from McKenna and Cooper to strengthen the
argument for preemption. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 17–22.
133. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 9; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief,
supra note 9, at 20; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 10; see also infra Part III.A.
134. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 10; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief,
supra note 9, at 20; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11.
135. See Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 8, Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d
1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (No. 12-00954) [hereinafter McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief]; see
also Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 13, Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805
(M.D. Tenn. 2013) (No. 12-00654) [hereinafter Cooper Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief].
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because they treat Backpage.com as a publisher of third-party content and
thus are preempted by the CDA.136
When discussing Congress‘s intent in passing the CDA, Backpage.com
argued that Congress intended to encourage interactive computer services to
restrict access to objectionable online material through voluntary
participation in self-policing.137
Backpage.com therefore found the
problems with this state legislation two-fold. On the one hand, these
statutes ―in one sense [made] review and monitoring mandatory, given the
risk of state criminal liability.‖138 Conversely, Backpage.com noted that
the statutes‘ ―knowing‖ mens rea requirement may actually dissuade
websites from reviewing third-party content to avoid criminal liability, thus
contradicting § 230 and Congress‘s intent.139
Lastly, Backpage.com echoed important public policy concerns raised in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc.140 and other cases finding CDA immunity.141
Backpage.com highlighted the differences between internet and brick-andmortar stores, including the global nature of online business and the
challenges of requiring identification before third-party posting.142
Backpage.com contended that verifying identification before posting will
dissuade individuals from posting content because of privacy burdens.143
Thus, Backpage.com argued, these statutes ―would severely restrict speech
on the Internet, exactly what Congress sought to avoid.‖144
Legal scholar Eric Goldman speaks out frequently in support of the CDA
and its immunity provision.145 Shortly after the district court‘s decision in
McKenna, Goldman penned an article in support of Backpage.com and the
decision.146 Goldman argued that the Washington statute could undermine
§ 230‘s immunity by making websites undertake costly verification and
136. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief,
supra note 9, at 22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 13.
137. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14.
138. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14.
139. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 9; see also Cooper
Plaintiff‘s Reply Brief, supra note 135, at 14.
140. 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
141. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s
Brief, supra note 9, at 21–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12.
142. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 11–12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s
Brief, supra note 9, at 21–22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12.
143. See McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12; see also Hoffman Plaintiff‘s
Brief, supra note 9, at 22; Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12.
144. McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12.
145. On Forbes.com and in his Technology & Marketing Law Blog, Eric Goldman has
posted many articles concerning § 230 and its immunity provision. See Eric Goldman, Why
The State Attorneys General’s Assault On Internet Immunity Is A Terrible Idea, FORBES
(June 27, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/06/27/why-thestate-attorneys-generals-assault-on-internet-immunity-is-a-terrible-idea; infra notes 146–49
and accompanying text.
146. See Eric Goldman, Backpage Gets Important 47 USC 230 Win Against Washington
Law Trying to Combat Online Prostitution Ads, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 31, 2012),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/07/backpage_gets_i.htm.
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record-keeping efforts.147 As a result, operation of user-generated content
websites would be cost prohibitive, especially for small businesses and new
entrants to the market.148 In a blog post after Cooper, Goldman noted that
the courts‘ interpretation of § 230 is favorable because ―it focuses on
statutory effect, not just the statute‘s literal words‖ and noted that other
courts should follow Cooper‘s approach so that states cannot ―come up with
other tricky legislative workarounds to Section 230.‖149 Kevin Bankston,
an attorney for the Center for Democracy & Technology, also spoke out
supporting CDA immunity in the Backpage.com litigation.150 Bankston
noted that liability for third-party content, as imposed by these state
statutes, ―would be devastating to the free expression environment
online.‖151 Bankston and Goldman both echoed the policy arguments made
by Backpage.com in its briefs in support of CDA immunity.
2. States: Arguments Against Preemption
In response to Backpage.com‘s motion for a preliminary injunction in
each case, the state attorney general filed an opposition brief arguing that
the CDA did not preempt the legislation in question.152
The states addressed the merits of Backpage.com‘s facial attack on the
statutes in question.153 The states argued that, to succeed in a facial
challenge, Backpage.com must show that the statute would not be valid
under any circumstances.154 Because the statutes also apply to other forms
of media and traffickers themselves, the states argued that Backpage.com
failed to meet this burden and thus the statute survives CDA preemption.155
Further, the states argued that the statutes in question are consistent with
the CDA based on the CDA‘s stated purpose of protecting minors from
obscenity on the internet and thus are not preempted under § 230(e)(3).156
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Eric Goldman, Some 47 USC 230 Cases From the Past Year You Might Have Missed
(Because I Didn’t Blog Them), TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (July 5, 2013),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/07/some_47_usc_230.htm.
150. See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How an Anti-Prostitution Campaign Could Threaten
Free Speech Online, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/09/heres-how-an-anti-prostitution-campaign-could-threatenfree-speech-online/.
151. Id.
152. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 10–18; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–17; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at
8–17.
153. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14.
154. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14.
155. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 11–12; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–14.
156. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 14–17; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 16–17; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at
12–17. The state in McKenna engages in an examination of the word ―consistent‖ and its
ordinary meaning—―in agreement with, compatible, or conforming to the same principles or
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The states viewed § 230(e)(3) as an explicit statement of congressional
intent to grant interactive computer services immunity under state or local
proceedings but not as automatic preemption.157 Rather, the states argued
that the CDA only preempts state laws that are inconsistent with the
CDA.158 Thus, the states contended that the ―criminal statute can exist in
tandem with [the CDA], and the two statutes do not conflict.‖159 Because
the statutes at issue regulate conduct, not speech, and thus do not treat
Backpage.com as a publisher or speaker of information, they are not
preempted by the CDA.160
Lastly, the states argued that the statutes are consistent with the purposes
behind § 230 and federal criminal laws, which are exempt from CDA
immunity, and thus consistent with the CDA.161 Therefore, the states
conclude that the statutes in question are not preempted by the CDA.162
3. The District Court Decisions
In McKenna, Cooper, and Hoffman, the courts all ruled in favor of
Backpage.com under a broad interpretation of CDA immunity.163 Because
plaintiff Backpage.com sought a preliminary injunction of the statutes, it
course of action‖—to conclude that the statute is in fact consistent with the CDA. McKenna
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 14. This, the state claims, is supported by the legislative
history of the CDA. Id. at 15–16.
157. See McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 8, 10; see also Hoffman
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 13–17; Cooper Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 16–
17. This theory is based entirely on the plain text of the statute. Section 230(e)(3) states:
―No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local
law that is inconsistent with this section.‖ 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012). However, it does
not say that no law may be enacted to impose liability for third-party content; rather, states
can enact legislation but its application may be preempted depending on the specific facts of
a case.
158. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 11 (―Under this express
pronouncement, the Act is not preempted by the CDA unless it is inconsistent with the
CDA.‖).
159. Id. at 10.
160. The statutes each differ in their application to an interactive service provider. The
Tennessee statute criminalizes the selling or offering to sell of advertisements, not the
posting. As a result, the state argues that the statutes impose liability regardless of
dissemination, so long as a sale was made. Therefore, the statute does not treat an
interactive service provider as a publisher. In contrast, the Washington and New Jersey
statutes criminalize the knowing publication of advertisements. See supra note 121.
161. McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 12–17.
162. The states contend that Congress‘s focus in enacting the CDA was to provide
interactive computer services with immunity from civil liability. In the Hoffman brief, the
state goes so far as to argue that Congress did not intend to apply CDA immunity to criminal
prosecutions at all, though this is disputed by the plaintiffs and other court interpretations of
the CDA. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 13–14. The state noted that the
CDA ―was not meant to create a lawless no-man‘s-land on the Internet.‖ Hoffman
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 17 (quoting Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
521 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008)).
163. See Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13 Civ. 03952, 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J.
Aug. 20, 2013); Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013);
Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262 (W.D. Wash. 2012). The court
opinions are very similar in both reasoning and text and are identical in outcome: all three
judges granted preliminary injunctions in favor of Backpage.com.
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―must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public
interest.‖164 With this framework in mind, the courts examined whether the
plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits in part by determining the
likelihood of CDA preemption.
In making this decision, the courts first looked to the relevant provisions:
§ 230(c) and § 230(e)(3).165 The courts analyzed Congress‘s purpose in
enacting the statute, noting that Congress purposely decided not to treat
interactive computer services like newspapers, magazines, or television
stations, which may face liability based on third-party content.166 There are
two primary reasons behind this decision: to encourage free speech and
development of the internet and to encourage computer services to selfpolice the internet for obscenity.167
After highlighting the standards for preemption, the courts found that the
statutes here are likely expressly preempted by the CDA and likely conflict
with federal law.168 After analyzing the consistency between the statutes in
question and the CDA, the courts ultimately held that these criminal statutes
would treat interactive computer services as publishers and would
contradict the stated purposes of Congress by discouraging self-policing
online.169 Therefore, the courts decided that § 230 likely preempts the
statutes.170
164. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also McKenna,
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1269.
165. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5–6; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 822–23;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
166. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824–25;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
167. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824–25;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271.
168. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *5; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823–26;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
169. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *5–7; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 824;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273.
170. See Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *6; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 828; McKenna,
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275. Backpage.com raised two additional claims in this litigation:
violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and violation of the Commerce Clause.
See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 22–23, 35; see also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief,
supra note 9, at 13–14, 22; McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12–13, 22.
Backpage.com argues that this new legislation violates the First Amendment by ―requir[ing]
online service providers to become the government‘s censors of the Internet,‖ consequently
blocking protected speech, dispensing with scienter, and failing strict scrutiny. See Hoffman
Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 13; see also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12;
McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 12. In response, the states argued that the
legislation does include a scienter requirement and does not violate the First Amendment
because it regulates unprotected illegal speech and thus is content neutral, surviving both
intermediate and strict scrutiny. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 20–38; see
also Cooper Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 17–23; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra
note 10, at 17–20. Backpage.com also argues that the new legislation violates the
Commerce Clause by regulating commerce outside state borders because the internet does
not recognize geographic borders. See Hoffman Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 35–38; see
also Cooper Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note 9, at 22–24; McKenna Plaintiff‘s Brief, supra note
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C. The Current Landscape
In each case, the district courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and
granted a preliminary injunction that effectively prevented enforcement of
the new legislation.171 The Washington legislature went so far as to repeal
the enjoined statute.172 A district court in the Middle District of Tennessee
issued a decision granting a permanent injunction,173 and a district court in
the District of New Jersey issued a decision granting a preliminary
injunction, which was appealed to the Third Circuit but ultimately
dismissed in June 2014.174 Preemption was one of the key issues in the
appeal.175 In August 2014, Backpage.com moved for summary judgment in
the District Court of New Jersey, seeking to convert the preliminary
injunction into a permanent injunction.176 The defendants submitted a letter
advising the court that the state does not oppose Backpage.com‘s summary
judgment motion.177
A year prior, in July 2013, the attorneys general of forty-nine states wrote
to Congress requesting that the CDA be amended to expressly state that it
does not preempt state criminal statutes.178 In response, the American Civil
9, at 22–23. The states contend that there is no Commerce Clause violation because the laws
―further a legitimate local public interest without imposing an excessive burden on interstate
commerce.‖ Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at 38–42; see also Cooper
Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at 30–35; McKenna Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 10, at
33–36. Although the courts here could have simply stopped at preemption, as preemption
bars the litigation before even answering the constitutional questions, they decided
otherwise. The courts disagreed with the states, finding that Backpage.com would likely
succeed on the merits of both the First Amendment and Commerce Clause claims. See
Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 at *7–10, *12; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 828–45; McKenna,
881 F. Supp. 2d at 1275, 1286. Thus, the courts ruled in favor of Backpage.com and granted
the preliminary injunction.
171. See generally Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 805;
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
172. S. 5488, 63rd. Leg. (Wash. 2013), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/
billdocs/2013-14/Pdf/Bill%20Reports/Senate/5488%20SBR%20FBR%2013.pdf (repealing
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.68A.104 (West 2012)).
173. See David Gialanella, Law Banning Underage Escort Ads Enjoined as
Constitutionally Flawed, N.J. L.J. (Aug. 9, 2013, 5:44 PM), http://www.law.com/jsp/nj/
PubArticleFriendlyNJ.jsp?id=1202614767613.
174. See id.; see also Dismissal Order, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-3850 (3d
Cir. June 10, 2014).
175. Concise Summary of the Case at 2, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 13-3850
(3d Cir. Oct. 8, 2013). The appeal raised two other issues: ―Whether N.J. Stat. Ann. §
2C:13-10b(1) comports with the First and Fourteenth Amendments [and] [w]hether N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 2C:13-10b(1) runs afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause.‖ Id.
176. Motion for Summary Judgment at 1–2, Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, No. 203952 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013), 2013 WL 4502097.
177. Letter from Defendants to Hon. Claire Cecchi, Hoffman, No. 2-03952.
178. See Att‘ys Gen. Letter, supra note 8. The attorneys general first noted that sex
traffickers use online classifieds as a vehicle for sex trades in many cases. See id. As a
result, websites such as Backpage.com.com have built their businesses around this income
from ―adult‖ advertisements. See id. After highlighting the purposes of the CDA and stories
of recent online trafficking victims, the attorneys general requested that Congress amend the
CDA to read (amended language italicized): ―Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to obscenity)
or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal or State
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Liberties Union (ACLU) and other interested groups submitted a letter to
Congress in support of the CDA in its current form, raising similar
arguments to those made by Backpage.com.179 Eric Goldman boldly wrote
that ―amending Section 230 to address online prostitution would be a
spectacularly bad idea.‖180
III. VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF CDA IMMUNITY AND THE STATES‘
OPTIONS IN THE FACE OF PREEMPTION
The dispute concerning whether these state criminal laws are preempted
by the CDA highlights important concerns with respect to CDA immunity
and interpretation. Part III of this Note examines the growing conflict
regarding interpretation of the CDA‘s immunity provision that has
developed among the courts over the past decade. Part III.A analyzes how
courts have interpreted immunity under the CDA differently, which
effectively decides the preemption question. Part III.B explores the
litigation and legislation options states have to combat minor sex trafficking
when confronting CDA preemption.
A. Conflicting Interpretations of CDA Immunity
Since the enactment of the CDA, courts have disagreed over the
interpretation of the immunity granted to interactive computer services.
Although the majority of courts have interpreted CDA immunity broadly,
some courts and legal scholars are beginning to argue for a narrower
interpretation in light of the growth and changes of the internet since the
enactment of the CDA. Part III.A.1 assesses the broad interpretation of
CDA immunity implemented by the majority of courts. Part III.A.2
examines the narrower interpretation applies in a number of recent cases.
1. Broad Interpretation of ―Interactive Computer Service‖ and Immunity
Under the CDA
The Fourth Circuit‘s decision in Zeran v. America Online, Inc.181 has
become the foundation of the extensive jurisprudence applying a broad
criminal statute.‖ Id. (emphasis in original). This, according to the letter, will restore to state
authorities the ―traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those who promote
prostitution and endanger our children.‖ Id.
179. See Letter to Congress (July 30, 2013), available at https://www.cdt.org/
files/pdfs/coalition-230-letter-congress.pdf. This letter was undersigned by a number of
advocacy organizations, associations, investors, and legal scholars who opposed the
suggestion of the Attorneys General to amend the CDA. See id. The letter concluded that
amending the CDA would ―jeopardize the continued growth of the entire Internet industry
and the free expression rights of Internet users everywhere‖ by disincentivizing websites
from hosting third-party content. Id. In the letter, the undersigned stressed the importance of
the need to work together to find a solution to the problem of sex trafficking while
preserving free speech and innovation online but noted that the amendment suggested
―should not be the starting point for . . . a productive dialogue between Congress, the State
AGs, and the Internet community.‖ Id.
180. Goldman, supra note 146.
181. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
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interpretation of CDA immunity.182 The decision, rendered shortly after the
statute‘s enactment in 1996, was one of the first cases to interpret the CDA
and has been cited by the majority of circuit courts that grant CDA
immunity to websites and other interactive computer services.183
In Zeran, plaintiff Kenneth Zeran brought a civil action against AOL,
arguing that AOL had acted negligently when ―unreasonably delay[ing]
removing defamatory messages posted by an unidentified third party,
refus[ing] to post retractions of those messages, and fail[ing] to screen for
similar postings thereafter.‖184 AOL argued that the newly enacted CDA
immunized AOL as an interactive computer service from civil liability for
third-party content.185 The district court ruled in favor of AOL, and Zeran
appealed to the Fourth Circuit.186
The court first established that AOL is in fact an interactive computer
service under the CDA, as it allows subscribers to access information stored
on its network.187 The court then addressed the immunity provision under
§ 230(c), finding that ―lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for
its exercise of a publisher‘s traditional editorial functions . . . are barred.‖188
Congress, the court found, recognized that the threat of tort-based liability
would likely chill free speech on the ―new and burgeoning Internet
medium‖ as interactive computer services would likely choose to restrict
posted messages.189 Although scanning each post to determine if it
contains defamatory information may be feasible for a traditional print
publisher, the court found that ―the sheer number of postings on interactive
computer services would create an impossible burden in the Internet
context.‖190
Therefore, by immunizing interactive computer services from liability,
Congress could still enforce federal criminal laws against the original
culpable party while ―encourag[ing] service providers to self-regulate the
dissemination of offensive material over their services.‖191 Noting that
Congress enacted the ―broad immunity‖ of § 230 with these purposes in
mind, the court found that Zeran‘s negligence claim incorrectly treated
AOL as a traditional publisher, and thus the court immunized AOL from
liability.192
182. See Cecilia Ziniti, The Optimal Liability System for Online Service Providers: How
Zeran v. America Online Got It Right and Web 2.0 Proves It, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 583,
585 (2008).
183. See Mark D. Quist, “Plumbing the Depths” of the CDA: Weighing the Competing
Fourth and Seventh Circuit Standards of ISP Immunity Under Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 275, 286 (2012) (observing that
Zeran ―remains the most commonly cited case in statutory analyses of Section 230‖).
184. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 328–29.
188. Id. at 330.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 333.
191. Id. at 331.
192. Id.
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Other circuits have repeatedly applied Zeran‘s broad interpretation of
CDA immunity from civil liability, referencing Zeran‘s reasoning and
interpretation in granting CDA immunity.193 The analysis in these cases is
substantially similar. First, courts restate the relevant provisions of § 230
that call for immunity of interactive computer services.194 The courts then
address Congress‘s dual purpose in enacting the CDA: ―to encourage the
unfettered and unregulated development of free speech on the Internet, and
to promote the development of e-commerce.‖195 Courts then engage in an
analysis of these purposes and the dangers posed to free speech on the
internet without immunity, citing to Zeran and other subsequent cases.196
Finally, the courts grant immunity to the website at issue.197
In addition to expansively interpreting the CDA‘s immunity provision,
these cases have broadly interpreted the definition of an interactive
computer service while rejecting any argument that would label the same
interactive computer service an information content provider.198 In effect,
this has led to an even broader grant of immunity under the CDA, as
websites are immune even if engaging in activities that could be considered
the ―creation or development of information.‖199 Supporters of this
expansive immunity reason that the CDA ensures free speech online, while
fostering the growth and development of the internet, and oppose attempts
at CDA reform that would threaten these First Amendment protections.200
Some courts and legal scholars have acknowledged the challenges posed
by this immunity. In Blumenthal v. Drudge,201 the court noted that ―[i]f it
were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs.‖202
However, the court acknowledged that Congress made a different policy
193. See, e.g., Universal Commc‘n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419–420 (1st
Cir. 2007); Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006); Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d
1018, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2003); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003);
Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000).
194. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 418–19; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1320–22; Carafano, 339
F.3d at 1123–24; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026–29; Green, 318 F.3d at 470–71; Ben Ezra, 206
F.3d at 985; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
195. Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1027.
196. See, e.g., Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1323; Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1122–23; Batzel, 333
F.3d at 1028; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 985 n.3; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
197. See, e.g., Lycos, 478 F.3d at 422; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324; Carafano, 339 F.3d at
1125; Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1035; Green, 318 F.3d at 473; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 980, 987–
988; Zeran, 129 F.3d at 335.
198. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (―In light of these concerns, reviewing courts have
treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive definition of
‗interactive computer service‘ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‗information content
provider‘.‖).
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
200. See Quist, supra note 183, at 308–09 (noting that if Congress wishes to resolve the
CDA conflict, it must do so without undermining the internet‘s development); see also
William H. Freivogel, Does the Communications Decency Act Foster Indecency?, 16 COMM.
L. & POL‘Y 17, 44 (2011) (―Even some of the most moderate of the reforms . . . could raise
First Amendment problems.‖).
201. 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998).
202. Id. at 51.
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choice and ―has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to
Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other
offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even
attempted.‖203 This statement expresses the inherent challenge that has led
some courts to narrow their interpretation of CDA immunity. Moreover,
with the increasing prevalence of cyberbullying, defamatory posts on social
media, and online sex trafficking, many legal scholars and government
officials have noted that the CDA‘s vague language has resulted in overly
broad immunity for proper internet regulation.204 Section 230(e) also acts
as an obstacle for state legislatures attempting to combat these issues by
establishing new criminal laws that are often preempted by the CDA.205 As
a result, some courts and scholars have become skeptical of the broad
immunity conferred by § 230, and a growing minority of cases have
narrowed the interpretation of the CDA.
2. Narrowing Interpretation of ―Interactive Computer Service‖ and
Immunity Under the CDA
In a number of recent cases, courts have conducted a more searching
review of the acts of interactive computer services and have narrowed the
interpretation of CDA immunity to impose liability on websites for thirdparty content. First, in two Seventh Circuit cases, Judge Easterbrook
expressed his views in dicta that a narrower interpretation may be more
appropriate, and other judges have agreed.206 Next, the Ninth Circuit in
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com207 denied
CDA immunity and imposed liability on the interactive computer service
Roommates.com.208 Finally, the Tenth Circuit, following the lead of the
Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com, also denied CDA immunity to an
interactive computer service in FTC v. Accusearch.209
Although the facts of these minority cases are markedly different than the
ones discussed in Part III.A.1, the reasoning behind the decisions is crucial
203. Id. at 52.
204. See Freivogel, supra note 200, at 19 (―One impetus for limiting Section 230
immunity comes from instances of anonymous Internet abuse that have grabbed headlines
and largely escaped legal consequences . . . abuses include cyberbullying of teens, the
humiliation of female college students, racially discriminatory housing postings, ubiquitous
pornography.‖).
205. See id.; see also supra Part II.
206. See, e.g., Chi. Lawyers‘ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,
519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008); Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
207. 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
208. See id.
209. See FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009). The Eastern District of
Kentucky in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings, 766 F. Supp. 2d 828, 836 (E.D.
Ky. 2011), also applied the Roommates.com holding to find interactive computer service
liability, illustrating the shift from the typical broad immunity conferred to websites
occurring in a minority of courts. The court denied CDA immunity to Dirty World LLC,
noting that ―[t]he immunity afforded by the CDA is not absolute and may be forfeited if the
site owner invites the posting of illegal materials or makes actionable postings itself,‖ as
Dirty World did here by posting defamatory statements written by an employee as part of the
website‘s businesses. Id.
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to understanding this change in interpretation. In Doe v. GTE Corp.210 and
Chicago Lawyers’ Community for Civil Rights Under Law v. Craigslist,211
the Seventh Circuit addressed the need for narrower interpretation of the
CDA.212 Judge Easterbrook penned these two opinions, urging judges to
interpret the CDA in the context of its title, ―Protection for ‗Good
Samaritan‘ blocking and screening of offensive material.‖213 Under the
current broad interpretation, Judge Easterbrook noted that interactive
computer services are encouraged to do nothing about the distribution of
indecent and offensive materials and still enjoy immunity under § 230(c),
which is exactly contrary to the intentions of Congress as outlined in
§ 230(b).214 However, Judge Easterbrook also acknowledged that the CDA
does not provide ―a grant of comprehensive immunity from civil liability
for content provided by a third party.‖215
Although the decisions in both Doe and Chicago Lawyers’ Community
granted CDA immunity, Judge Easterbrook addressed important concerns
about the broad, majority interpretation of immunity. 216 He noted in dicta
that ―causing a particular statement to be made, or perhaps [causing] the
discriminatory content of a statement‖ to be made by a third party may be
sufficient to deny CDA immunity and hold an interactive computer service
liable for that content.217 This is the same reasoning that is used by a
minority of courts in denying CDA immunity to interactive computer
services.
Only five years later, the Ninth Circuit issued a striking opinion in
Roommates.com that utilized a narrow interpretation of CDA immunity to
find that Roommates.com acted as an information content provider.218
Roommates.com ―elicit[ed] the allegedly illegal content and [made]
aggressive use of it in conducting its business‖ by requiring users to answer
discriminatory questions before creating housing profiles and thus acted as
an information content provider for the purposes of § 230.219
Judge Kozinski pointed out an important distinction in the congressional
intent of the CDA overlooked by many other circuits.220 In enacting the
CDA, ―Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated
content, not the creation of content.‖221 If an interactive computer service
posts original content or is responsible for the creation or development of

210. 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
211. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
212. Id. at 666; see also GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 655.
213. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012); see also GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660.
214. See GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660 (―Why should a law designed to eliminate ISPs‘
liability to the creators of offensive material end up defeating claims by the victims of
tortious or criminal conduct?‖).
215. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 670.
216. See Quist, supra note 183, at 296.
217. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm., 519 F.3d at 671.
218. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
219. Id. at 1172.
220. See id. at 1163.
221. Id.
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such content, it may also be an information content provider.222 When an
interactive computer service acts as an information content provider,
Congress did not intend for CDA immunity to apply.223 It is based on this
reasoning that the Ninth Circuit denied Roommates.com immunity.
The court noted an important policy concern that justifies a narrow
interpretation of CDA immunity and preemption:
The Internet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of
laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses. Rather, it
has become a dominant—perhaps the preeminent—means through which
commerce is conducted. And its vast reach into the lives of millions is
exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the scope of the immunity
provided by Congress and thus give online businesses an unfair advantage
over their real-world counterparts, which must comply with laws of
general applicability.224

The court recognized the changes in the internet and its maturity over the
last decade and reasoned that this is a strong indication that a narrower
interpretation of CDA immunity is more appropriate.225 ―[S]uch a broad
reading[,]‖ as in cases such as Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc.,226
―would sap section 230 of all meaning.‖227 Thus, the Ninth Circuit created
a new rule that has been applied by a minority of circuits over the past five
years: ―a website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within
the exception to [§ 230 immunity], if it contributes materially to the alleged
illegality of the conduct.‖228
In FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit looked at the meaning of the
words ―development‖ and ―responsible‖ in the definition of information
content provider to determine whether, as in Roommates.com, the website
operator should be denied CDA immunity.229 The Court construed the term
―development‖ broadly, and held that an interactive computer service is
responsible for the development of offensive content only if it in some way

222. See id. at 1162–63.
223. See id. (―When Congress passed section 230 it didn‘t intend to prevent the
enforcement of all laws online; rather, it sought to encourage interactive computer services
that provide users neutral tools to post content online to police that content without fear that
through their ‗good samaritan . . . screening of offensive material,‘ . . . they would become
liable for every single message posted by third parties on their website.‖).
224. Id. at 1164–65 n.15.
225. See id.
226. 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
227. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1172. The court engaged in an extensive
discussion of why its holding does not contradict other Ninth Circuit precedent such as
Carafano v. Metrosplash. See id. at 1171–76. The court concluded that the case at bar is
quite different than Carafano in that Roommates.com explicitly elicited the discriminatory
information from users. See id.
228. Id. at 1168. Judge Kozinski opined: ―The message to website operators [after this
case] is clear: If you don‘t encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users
to input illegal content, you will be immune.‖ See id. at 1175.
229. FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197–200 (10th Cir. 2009).
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specifically encourages the development of the offensive content; thus,
Accusearch was liable as an information content provider.230
The primary argument against narrower immunity is the threat to free
speech and innovation on the internet.231 However, there is still support for
narrower immunity both within these opinions and in the legal world.232
For example, in a Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy article, Gregory
Dickinson argued against broad immunity when stating that the internet
―and its extremely broad immunity seems slightly out of step with modern
policy objectives.‖233 He reasoned that as a ―robust and integral part of
modern life[,]‖ the internet can now be safely subjected to some
regulation.234 Thus, a narrower interpretation of CDA immunity would be
more appropriate to regulate conduct online.235 Further, the notion that
holding websites liable for third-party content or requiring review of online
posts would be too burdensome is losing traction as many websites,
including Backpage.com, have started to actively screen material before
publication with little imposition.236
Although these arguments for limited immunity are logically consistent
with the purposes of the CDA,237 narrower CDA immunity is still the
minority viewpoint among the courts. Therefore, when confronted with
CDA immunity, those looking to impose civil or criminal liability on
interactive computer services such as Backpage.com must tackle a
challenging obstacle and consider new solutions to an enduring problem.
B. Potential Solutions to Combat Domestic Minor Sex Trafficking
in the Face of CDA Preemption
States have litigation and legislation options to stop minor sex trafficking
online despite CDA preemption. Since the enactment of the CDA, a
230. Id.
231. See, e.g., Gregory M. Dickinson, An Interpretive Framework for Narrower Immunity
Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 863
(2010); Matthew G. Jeweler, The Communications Decency Act of 1996: Why § 230 Is
Outdated and Publisher Liability for Defamation Should Be Reinstated Against Internet
Service Providers, 8 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL‘Y 3 (2007) (arguing that distributor liability
should be reinstated to narrow CDA immunity); Miree Kim, Narrowing the Definition of an
Interactive Service Provider Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 2003 B.C.
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 33102 (arguing that Congress should create a narrower definition
of interactive computer service in order to protect the internet).
232. See Dickinson, supra note 231, at 874.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. See id.
236. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 110–11. Larkin notes: ―every court which has granted
immunity under Section 230 has noted the impossibility of manually reviewing each post for
potential liability. Craigslist‘s decision to recruit a staff to review each proposed post
undercuts this rationale for immunity.‖ Id. at 110. In reviewing its posts with even more
manpower and levels of review than Craigslist, Backpage.com is also undercutting this
justification. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
237. See Quist, supra note 183, at 296 (noting that ―insomuch as [limited immunity]
embraces the limited goal of incentivizing content monitoring under the CDA, it remains
logically consistent‖ with congressional intent).
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number of legal scholars, courts, and other interested parties have suggested
that a change in the CDA may be necessary to combat minor sex trafficking
online. Part III.B.1 examines the litigation strategies states may employ to
hold websites such as Backpage.com liable for permitting prostitution
advertising on its ―adult‖ section. Part III.B.2 outlines the legislative
options that Congress has to permit states to effectively combat sex
trafficking online.
1. Litigation Options
Legal scholars have examined the possible litigation strategies that can
be pursued against websites such as Backpage.com.238 In the face of CDA
preemption of inconsistent state criminal laws, such as the statutes at issue
in the Backpage.com litigation, these strategies may prove useful in helping
hold websites criminally accountable for posting minor sex trafficking
advertisements.
One of the stated policy goals of § 230 is ―to ensure vigorous
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.‖239 With this in
mind, Congress expressly created an exception to CDA immunity under
federal law.240 Therefore, the strongest avenue of criminal prosecution
against Backpage.com and other websites may be through federal law.241
Prosecutors may have success by charging Backpage.com under federal
obscenity law.242 One of the expressly exempted federal laws, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1465, criminalizes the knowing production with the intent to transport, or
the knowing transportation, of an interactive computer service for the
purpose of the sale or distribution of obscene media.243 Advertisements in
Backpage.com‘s ―adult‖ section often contain obscene images and text, thus
constituting obscene media under the statute.244 Because Backpage.com
admits to manually filtering the posts in its adult section, ―mens rea will be

238. See generally Larkin, supra note 62 (discussing prosecution strategies for civil and
criminal liability); see also Ashley Ingber, Cyber Crime Control: Will Websites Ever Be
Held Accountable for the Legal Activities They Profit from?, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
423, 441–45 (2012) (discussing different prosecution options for liability under criminal
law).
239. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (2012).
240. Id. § 230(e)(1) (―No effect on criminal law. Nothing in this section shall be
construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of title 18 or any other Federal
criminal statute.‖).
241. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 95.
242. See id.
243. 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2012); see also Larkin, supra note 62, at 95 (discussing
prosecution under obscenity); Lawrence G. Walters, Shooting the Messenger: An Analysis
of Theories of Criminal Liability Used Against Adult-Themed Online Service Providers, 23
STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 171, 191–92 (2012) (discussing potential for obscenity prosecutions
against online service providers).
244. See Hoffman Defendants‘ Brief, supra note 2, at Ex. A (displaying Backpage.com
advertisements including promiscuous pictures and text).
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all but a non-issue,‖ and criminal liability may follow.245 However, there is
little case law thus far to support the use of § 1465 against corporate
website operators.
Prosecutors may also look to prosecute Backpage.com under an
accomplice liability theory of aiding and abetting prostitution.246 Under 18
U.S.C. § 2, a defendant is punishable as a principal if he or she ―aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures‖ or ―willfully causes an act to be
done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States.‖247 In theory, if Backpage.com knowingly
published an advertisement for prostitution depicting a minor, it could be
liable for the same crime as the original third-party poster under the federal
prostitution statute.248 However, it will be a significant challenge to prove
that Backpage.com aided or ―willfully caused‖ prostitution under the
federal statute because proving knowledge will be difficult given the
volume of advertisements Backpage.com reviewers see each day.249
Prosecutors may also be successful in charging Backpage.com under
federal child pornography laws.250 According to a symposium article by
scholar Lawrence Walters, under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A, the government must
prove:
(1) The defendant knowingly received or possessed an item or items of
child pornography, as charged;
(2) Such items of child pornography had been transported, shipped or
mailed in interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer; and
(3) At the time of such reception or possession of the materials, the
defendant believed that such items constituted or contained child
pornography.251

Thus, the government may be able to prove these elements by showing
that Backpage.com allowed third parties to post sexual advertisements
depicting pornographic images of minors, especially because these laws do
not specifically require proof of defendant‘s knowledge of the minor‘s
age.252 Nevertheless, prosecutors will still face the challenge of proving
245. Larkin, supra note 62, at 97; see also supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text
(discussing Backpage.com‘s review procedures).
246. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 97; see also Ingber, supra note 238, at 444 (discussing
potential accomplice liability for online service providers); Walters, supra note 243, at 191–
92 (same).
247. 18 U.S.C. § 2.
248. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 97; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (―Whoever knowingly
transports any individual in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with intent that such
individual engage in prostitution . . . can be charged with a criminal offense . . . .‖). Larkin
argued that Backpage.com may also be prosecuted under state promotion laws because the
website charges fees for the posting of adult advertisements, but the preemption of state law
claims under § 230(e)(3) may be problematic unless the court decides, as Larkin assumes
throughout his article, that Backpage.com is an information content provider. See Larkin,
supra note 62, at 95 n.72, 99–100; see also Ingber, supra note 238, at 445.
249. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 98; see also supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
250. See Walters, supra note 243, at 195.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 195–96.
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that this posting was made knowingly given the vast amount of posts
reviewed by Backpage.com staff each day.253 Further, there is a safe harbor
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 2258A, which would immunize Backpage.com from
liability when good faith policing efforts were taken to report child
exploitation.254 Backpage.com clearly has demonstrated its efforts to report
offenses to federal authorities and would thus likely find immunity from a
child pornography charge under this federal provision.255
When predicting the success of these prosecutions, it becomes clear that
Backpage.com and other interactive computer services will not bear
responsibility for minor sex trafficking on their sites ―unless either
legislatures reform the language of Section 230 to explicitly allow for
criminal liability, or judges start interpreting and enforcing it
differently.‖256 Therefore, although states may be able to encourage federal
prosecution of Backpage.com under the aforementioned laws, legislative
change is necessary to truly hold websites responsible for sex trafficking.
2. Legislative Options
Litigation options will likely be ineffective in holding sites like
Backpage.com responsible for its users‘ posts, and most state legislation is
preempted by the CDA.257 Therefore, Congress could act to amendthe
CDA, slightly curtailing CDA immunity for interactive computer services
while giving plaintiffs and state legislatures some ability to combat minor
sex trafficking online. Part III.B.2.a discusses an amendment to the CDA
that incorporates the notice-and-takedown model of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). Part III.B.2.b examines the attorneys general‘s
suggestions for a CDA amendment. Part III.B.2.c describes an amendment
to the CDA exempting all state human trafficking and prostitution laws.
a. CDA Amendment Incorporating the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s
Notice-and-Takedown Model
In a note for the New York University Annual Survey of American Law,
David Lukmire suggested that the notice-and-takedown model used in
applying the DMCA would be effective in applying the CDA.258 The
DMCA provides a liability shield for interactive computer services for
copyright-infringing content posted by third parties if the websites do not
have knowledge of infringement.259 The DMCA also provides that a
253. See Larkin, supra note 62, at 98 (discussing challenges of proving a knowledge
requirement in cases against Craigslist); see also supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
254. See Walters, supra note 243, at 197–98.
255. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
256. Ingber, supra note 238, at 445.
257. See supra Part II.B.1.
258. See Lukmire, supra note 64, at 406–07. Judge Berzon also endorsed this idea in a
footnote in Batzel v. Smith, where she mentioned that the DMCA notice-and-takedown
model may be a possible solution to the troubling results created by § 230. 333 F.3d 1018,
1031–32 n.19 (9th Cir. 2003).
259. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2012).
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website cannot be liable if ―upon notification of claimed
infringement . . . [it] responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing
activity.‖260
If Congress amended the CDA to include a similar notice-and-takedown
provision, it would provide a limited safe harbor for websites.261 There are
two conflicting viewpoints regarding the effectiveness of this limited
immunity. Some argue that if a website were given notice of a defamatory
or otherwise offensive posting, the website would be incentivized to remove
postings to maintain immunity under the notice-and-takedown
amendment.262 Thus, congressional intent behind the CDA immunity
would be preserved because offensive postings would be removed.263 On
the other hand, some argue that websites would be incentivized not to
police the content on their website so as to avoid ―knowingly‖ permitting
infringed material to be posted and would instead merely wait for
notification of offensive content.264
b. CDA Amendment to § 230(e)(1) Exempting All State Criminal Laws
The attorneys general of forty-nine states recommended that Congress
amend the CDA to exempt all state criminal laws from its purview, as
previously only federal criminal laws were exempt.265 By adding two
words—―or State‖—the attorneys general argue that Congress can restore
local authorities‘ ―traditional jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute those
who promote prostitution and endanger our children.‖266 Those who
support a CDA amendment note that the modification would only create
liability for illegal and injurious posted content.267 Therefore, eliminating
preemption of state criminal laws will give states an opportunity to combat
minor sex trafficking at a local level within their state.

260. Id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
261. See Lukmire, supra note 64, at 406.
262. See id.
263. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5).
264. See Ziniti, supra note 182, at 604–08; see also Jeweler, supra note 231, at 25.
Jeweler noted that ―some courts and scholars worry that this type of notice-based liability for
entities classified as distributors will encourage those entities to ignore the content that is
posted through their websites to avoid having the required notice.‖ Jeweler, supra note 231,
at 25. He also described the obvious contradiction identified by courts narrowly interpreting
§ 230: ―It is counterproductive to attempt to encourage websites to self-regulate offensive
content by immunizing them for the same offensive content, regardless of whether the
websites actually screen and police content.‖ Id. at 25–26. Therefore, notice-and-takedown
may be more successful than critics expect. See id. at 26–27. Conversely, Ziniti argued that
copyright law is too distinct from the CDA and thus it would be ineffective and far too
complicated to implement notice-and-takedown. See Ziniti, supra note 182, at 607–08.
265. See Att‘ys Gen. Letter, supra note 8.
266. Id. Abigail Lawlis Kuzma also discussed this amendment. See Kuzma, supra note
33, at 54–55. However, she acknowledged the shortcomings of the suggestion, noting that
the amendment would likely be ineffective given that attempts at using federal criminal laws,
which are exempt from the CDA, have been unsuccessful. See id. at 55.
267. See Petition, supra note 12.
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In response, the ACLU and other interest groups penned a letter to
Congress strongly opposing the suggestion by the attorneys general to
amend the CDA.268 These critics argued that this amendment would
dramatically reduce free expression online and plague websites with ―openended legal risk‖ from individualized state criminal statutes.269 Thus, when
faced with expensive and inconsistent obligations from state laws,
opponents argue that websites will be forced to comply with the most
restrictive statutes or shut down.270 Critics also argue that this amendment
is unnecessary.271 The CDA only bars inconsistent state laws,272 and states
can enact criminal laws to combat minor sex trafficking and prosecute the
actual traffickers or any ―service providers who actually aid and abet the
illegal conduct of others.‖273 In concluding their criticism, the signers
acknowledged the problem of sex trafficking and encouraged cooperation
between Congress, the attorneys general, and the internet community, but
they did not yet propose a specific amendment or suggestion for change.274
c. CDA Amendment to § 230(e) Exempting
State Human Trafficking and Prostitution Laws
The CDA already includes a number of important exceptions for different
laws that Congress felt § 230 immunity should not affect.275 An
amendment to the CDA creating an additional carve-out for human
trafficking and prostitution laws may be an effective way to permit states to
act without eliminating civil liability altogether.276 Abby Perer proposed a
―Commercial Sex Distribution Amendment‖ to the CDA where an
interactive computer service ―would become a distributor once local or
national law enforcement officials alerted the provider to the presence of
illegal sex-sales ads‖ and traditional distributor liability would apply from
there.277 This, she argued, would force websites to take responsibility for
third-party commercial sex advertisements and preserve the underlying
policy goals of the CDA by treating websites as distributors, not
publishers.278
Most critics of this amendment argued that it would crush free speech on
the internet.279 The court in Zeran also directly rejected this distinction and
held that distributor liability is merely a subset of publisher liability
precluded by § 230.280 Further, the court noted that distributor liability
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See Letter to Congress, supra note 179.
See id. at 2.
See Zimmerman, supra note 12.
See id.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (2012).
See id.
See Letter to Congress, supra note 179.
See supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
See Perer, supra note 73, at 847.
Id.
See id. at 847–50.
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 331–32.
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would require that interactive computer services review all postings to
avoid liability, which would prove challenging given the large number of
postings on the internet.281
Regardless of the variation of amendment selected, the greatest challenge
of all for states will be encouraging Congress to act and amend the CDA.282
IV. THE BEST SOLUTIONS IN THE FACE OF CDA PREEMPTION:
THE CASE FOR NARROWER IMMUNITY AND A FEDERAL CRIMINAL STATUTE
The unresolved questions are: First, should the CDA be broadly
interpreted to preempt state laws. Second, if states are confronted with
CDA preemption, what is the best course of action to effectively combat
minor sex trafficking online? Part IV of this Note attempts to reconcile this
conflict by arguing for a narrower interpretation of the CDA and a change
in the law. Part IV.A argues that a narrower interpretation of the CDA is
desirable given the development of the internet and the prevalence of minor
sex trafficking online. Part IV.B proposes a federal criminal statute that
punishes the knowing publication of online commercial sex advertisements
depicting minors that will effectively combat minor sex trafficking while
maintaining free speech and uniformity of law on the internet.
A. The Advantages of Narrowly Interpreting CDA Immunity
When Congress initially enacted the CDA, the internet was a new and
burgeoning medium filled with uncertainty.283 At the time, there were few
laws regulating the internet, and Congress recognized a problem with the
availability of obscene material online to children.284 Congress also
understood the large differences between the internet and traditional print,
recognizing the internet‘s potential as a forum for both speech and
commerce.285 Therefore, in enacting the CDA, Congress attempted to
reconcile these purposes by creating civil immunity for interactive computer
services, those providers that hosted third-party content.286 By providing
immunity from civil suits traditionally faced by print media, such as
defamation, to those who merely provided website services and did not
create content, Congress hoped to encourage providers to self-police their
websites for obscene content.287
When considering the numerous
exceptions from immunity Congress included in § 230, there is little
evidence that Congress realized or intended the expansive immunity that
has resulted from circuit court interpretations of these key definitions:
―interactive computer services‖ and ―information content provider.‖288 The
distinction between the two is at the heart of the debate and determines
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at 333.
See Lukmire, supra note 64, at 407.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.3.
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which websites are liable for third-party content and which are immune
under the CDA.289
In effect, the majority of circuit courts provide immunity under the CDA
to a variety of websites and internet hosts that walk a fine line between
providing and creating content.290 Although immunity is appropriate in
cases where third parties are solely responsible for creating the defamatory
content, extending this immunity to those websites that engage in
substantial modification of this content is inapposite and beyond Congress‘s
intent in enacting the CDA.291
The internet has changed significantly since 1996 and is now an
established medium with the capability of surviving under more restrictive
regulation.292 Now, the internet is a robust and developed technology that
can still flourish despite more regulation and liability, similar to regulation
of print media.293 Yet print media engaged in the same traditional
publishing functions do not have blanket immunity from all civil suits.294
Because posting online is more accessible for third-party users than
publishing in print media, the laws for each cannot be identical.295
Congress considered these differences in choosing to grant civil immunity
to interactive computer services that merely publish third-party content.296
The current expansive interpretation, however, provides too much freedom
to websites and internet hosts, such as Backpage.com, which post
potentially illegal content with no repercussions.297
Narrowing the interpretation of an ―interactive computer service‖ offers a
number of advantages. First, a narrower interpretation would more
effectively assign responsibility to websites capable of removing
defamatory and criminal content. Given the current state of technology that
has led to a surge in cyberbullying, commercial sex advertisements, and
other immoral or illegal content, this shifting responsibility is increasingly
important.298 In the digital age, as exemplified by Backpage.com‘s current
monitoring efforts, monitoring content is much easier and less costly for
websites in part due to advancements in keyword searching and filtering
technology.299 Holding websites accountable as information content
providers for knowingly publishing third-party content that is criminal in
nature is not so burdensome as to cripple e-commerce and chill free

289. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.; see also supra note 227 and
accompanying text (discussing Judge Kozinski‘s observation that a broad reading of § 230
eliminates its meaning).
291. See supra note 225 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 233–35 and
accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
295. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
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speech.300 As a result, scrutinizing internet publishing and narrowing the
definition of an immune interactive computer service would better regulate
a now-mature technology by holding those websites that extensively edit
and post third-party-created defamatory or criminal material liable as
―information content providers.‖301
Second, a narrower interpretation of the CDA would give plaintiffs and
prosecutors the tools to pursue justice when interactive computer services
deliberately act in an unlawful manner.302 If the courts applied a narrower
interpretation of CDA immunity in the litigation against Backpage.com, the
courts may have found Backpage.com liable under the CDA for
encouraging illegal content on its website.303
B. The Legislative Solution: A Federal Criminal Statute
The ideal way to achieve a narrower interpretation of the CDA—and
combat domestic minor sex trafficking online—is to change federal law.
Legislative action is more likely to succeed than judicial action, because
websites that do not create or substantially modify content may still qualify
for immunity, even under the Ninth Circuit‘s approach in Roommates.com.
Scholars have made numerous suggestions for what a legislative change
should look like and how it should affect the internet regulatory scheme.304
This Note proposes a new federal criminal statute that provides a uniform
standard for websites to follow and avoids preemption by the CDA, with
the same practical effect as those enacted by Washington, Tennessee, and
New Jersey. This new federal statute would criminalize the knowing
publication of online minor sex trafficking advertisements for traffickers
who purchased advertising space and websites who knowingly publish or
fail to take down advertisements despite having notice of illegality.
While it is true that the attorneys general‘s suggestion to eliminate
preemption for all state law criminal claims would give states more power
at a local level to combat trafficking, the amendment presents a number of
problems for websites and other service providers because of the internet‘s

300. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text. Under a narrower interpretation of
CDA immunity, immunity will still be granted when websites are acting solely as publishers
and not to create or develop content. Based on the rule in Roommates.com and the definition
of creation or development, under a narrower interpretation websites still must have
personally created or substantially modified the content. In order for a website to ensure
immunity, it must closely monitor anything its employees modify before publication.
Therefore, while some argue that narrower immunity may be burdensome on smaller
websites or new entrants, in order to maintain immunity a website must carefully monitor
only the content that it edits and reviews before publication. If it is capable of reviewing this
content, even a small website should be able to review it for defamatory or illegal material
without an excessive burden, especially given improvements in technology and filtering
software.
301. See supra notes 231–36 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 228 and accompanying text; see also Part II.B.
304. See supra Part III.B.
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global nature.305 Even with the existing technological advances, requiring
websites to comply with inconsistent state laws for any crime would be
burdensome.306 Moreover, because some states have criminal defamation
laws, an exemption for all state criminal laws would open the floodgates to
liability for the exact claim Congress intended to immunize.307
Additionally, an amendment to the CDA to exempt state laws specific to
sex crimes, such as minor sex trafficking, would not resolve all of the
problems presented by the attorneys general‘s suggestion either.308 While
websites would not be open to extensive liability for all crimes, they would
still be required to comply with fifty states‘ sex crimes laws.309 Although
these criminal statutes appear similar in ways, websites still must comply
with all state laws because of the global scope of the internet.310 The
internet does not recognize state borders in the same way print and other
media can, and thus, websites like Backpage.com are open to liability from
all states unless a geographic limitation is placed on its offerings and
advertisements.311 This type of limitation would cripple speech.312
Therefore, an amendment to the CDA exempting only state sex crime laws
would be ineffective and overly burdensome.313 Thus, the aforementioned
suggestions have a number of limitations that lead to overbreadth and
insufficiency and show that an amendment to the CDA may not be the right
solution.
This Note proposes a better and more effective legislative solution: a
federal statute criminalizing the knowing publication of online commercial
sex advertisements of minors. A federal statute modeled after the
Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey state laws would have many
advantages over individual state laws while still punishing those websites
that knowingly publish illicit advertisements.314
This federal criminal statute regulating online sex advertisements of
minors would be exempt from CDA immunity.315 Under § 230(e), the
CDA expressly exempts all federal criminal laws.316 This statute therefore
resolves the preemption challenge states have faced in the district court
cases addressed in Part II of this Note.317 Further, because these statutes
305. See supra Part III.B.2.b (discussing the differing viewpoints regarding the Attorneys
General‘s recent proposition for a CDA amendment).
306. See supra notes 269–70 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
308. See supra Part III.B.2.c (discussing Abby Perer‘s proposed ―Commercial Sex
Distribution Amendment‖ to the CDA).
309. See supra note 270 and accompanying text. Although the opponents to the attorneys
general‘s amendment presented this idea, the same reasoning would apply here.
310. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 170 (discussing the Commerce Clause claims brought by Backpage,
which highlight the global nature of the internet).
312. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part II.A; see also supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 82–87 and accompanying text.
317. See supra Part II.B (discussing the litigation between Backpage.com and the states in
which the courts found the state legislation was preempted by the CDA).
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have been tested in the district courts, Congress can learn from the mistakes
made by state legislatures and draft a federal statute that resolves the First
Amendment vagueness and overbreadth concerns raised by Backpage.com
and other websites.318 A federal statute can regulate interstate commerce
online and thus resolve the Commerce Clause issues argued in the district
courts.319
This federal criminal statute would punish those who knowingly publish
online sex advertisements. It directly furthers the states‘ goal of combating
minor trafficking on online classifieds such as Backpage.com.320 By
eliminating mistake of age as a defense, a federal criminal statute would
encourage companies to better monitor their posts and provide some form
of age verification.321 This statute furthers the states‘ mission to fight
online sex trafficking. It also furthers Congress‘s intent by encouraging
self-policing of obscene and illicit content online.322 Self-policing
continues to be an important goal today, as evidenced by the
recommendations for reform raised by senators and representatives.323
To ensure the continuation of content hosting on the internet, this federal
criminal statute would effectively reduce the risk of liability for websites
and other interactive computer services by including a notice-and-takedown
provision, similar to the DMCA.324 Given that Backpage.com and many
other websites already use technology and manual review to screen thirdparty postings, this model would be easy to implement.325 Further, the
statute is limited to content that advertises sex acts with minors.326 Thus,
sites that do not host punishable content, such as those run by small
businesses and retailers, will not be impacted by this statute.327 Lastly, this
notice-and-takedown model gives websites an opportunity to avoid liability
by taking down the offensive content and reporting the sex trafficking of
minors, something that many websites such as Backpage.com already
purport to do.328 However, it would still permit prosecution of websites
that knowingly post such advertisements or fail to remove illegal content.329
This federal criminal statute is not without flaws. It will not effectively
address the problem at a local level by giving states the power to enact
318. See supra note 170.
319. See supra note 170.
320. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
321. See supra notes 122–26 and accompanying text.
322. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part III.B.2.a (examining Lukmire‘s suggestion of a DMCA-style noticeand-takedown provision for the CDA).
325. See supra notes 47–53 and accompanying text.
326. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 119–21 and accompanying text.
328. See supra notes 260–61 and accompanying text. Congress could also consider
including a minimum standards provision, similar to the TVPA‘s minimum standards. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text. This provision could require websites that host thirdparty content to engage in some form of review, such as keyword searches, filtering, manual
review, or age verification. This decision, however, would best be left to Congress after
careful research and consideration of the costs and benefits of implementing such standards.
329. See supra notes 260–63 and accompanying text.
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individual legislation; however, that approach is inapt given the global
scope of the internet and its cross-border impact. It may also contain
loopholes that permit Backpage.com and other websites to host some minor
sex trafficking advertisements without consequence. Nevertheless, by
creating a manageable and effective regulatory model for online
advertisements, a federal criminal statute will further the states‘ interests in
combating minor sex trafficking at the source, while balancing the concerns
of internet providers and other interest groups.
CONCLUSION
Minor sex trafficking is a growing problem in the United States. The
explosion of classified advertisements on the internet provides a new outlet
for traffickers to find customers for prostitution and sexual exploitation.
Although these websites, such as Backpage.com, claim to monitor ―adult
entertainment‖ postings, advertisements are hardly censored and posters‘
ages are taken at face value. Change is necessary to control these illegal
advertisements, and states may be better situated to address this growing
problem. However, courts‘ broad interpretation of the CDA effectively
preempts states from passing legislation to take steps toward a solution.
Although changes in society and the maturing of the internet dictate that
a narrower interpretation of the CDA is appropriate, courts are unlikely to
change their interpretation because of strong judicial precedent favoring
immunity. With federal preemption creating barriers for state legislation,
states are left with few options. States can continue to enact creative
criminal statutes that narrowly avoid preemption or attempt to prosecute
these websites under federal law. The most effective resolution, however,
comes from Congress in the form of a federal statute criminalizing the
advertising of commercial sex acts depicting minors. A federal statute will
provide a uniform law for websites to follow while still taking steps to
combat minor sex trafficking online. Congress can build upon the states‘
experiences to draft improved legislation that resolves the constitutional
challenges states in district court litigation face. Further, including a noticeand-takedown provision will allow Backpage.com and other websites to
avoid liability by removing known minor sex trafficking advertisements.
By enacting this federal criminal statute, Congress and the states will
together make strides to protect America‘s children from victimization and
online sex trafficking.

